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Abstract— In this work a four terminal Gaussian network
composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a
jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the
source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to
decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other
hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming
Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this
problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game,
where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the
Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies.
The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and
the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is
the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless communications, messages are broadcasted,
and any transmission can be overheard by nearby nodes. If
illegitimate, passive listeners trying to understand messages,
known as eavesdroppers, are present in the environment, then
all confidential information such as user IDs, or passwords,
become vulnerable and can be identified. Therefore, security
against eavesdropping is an essential system requirement for
all wireless communication applications.
Security against eavesdropping using information theoretic
principles was first considered in [1]. In [2], the wire-tap chan-
nel was studied for the degraded case, when the eavesdrop-
per’s received signal is a degraded version of the legitimate
receiver’s observation. This model was extended to less noisy
and more capable wire-tap channels in [3]. The Gaussian case
was studied in [4]. Secure wireless networking applications
motivated recent interest in multi-user secret communication.
In [5] multiple access channels with confidential messages
were studied. The Gaussian multiple-access and two-way wire-
tap channels were investigated in [6] and [7].
Secrecy in relay channels was studied in [8], [9] and [10].
In these networks, the messages are to be kept secret from
the relay node itself. On the other hand, the relay channel
with an external eavesdropper is investigated in [11], [12]
and [13]. In [11], the authors suggest the noise forwarding
scheme, where the relay transmits dummy codewords that
can be decoded at the destination. While sending dummy
1This material is based upon work partially supported by NSF Grant No.
0635177, by the Center for Advanced Technology in Telecommunications
(CATT) of Polytechnic Institute of NYU.
codewords does not hurt the legitimate communication, it
increases the confusion at the eavesdropper, and hence helps
achieve a higher secrecy rate. Noise forwarding scheme is
similar to cooperative jamming [7], in which one of the users
in the system injects noise to increase achievable secrecy rates
in multi-access and two-way channels. Finally, the paper [14]
ties [11] and [7] together, and shows that the helper can
choose between sending structured codewords and pure noise
to increase achievable secrecy rates even further.
Unlike these works, in which user’s/relay’s transmissions
aim to help the legitimate source-destination communication,
the relay can aim to help the eavesdropper. In a general
multiple terminal network this is a possible scenario, if a relay
is captured by an adversary [15]. In this case, the relay aims to
decrease the secrecy rates. In [16] we studied this problem for
orthogonal transmission between the source and the relay and
compared secrecy rates achievable with amplify-and-forward,
decode-and-forward and compress-and-forward protocols with
the direct transmission.
In this work we revisit the problem of achieving secrecy
when the relay helps the eavesdropper. We assume that the
relay does not hear the source transmission and can therefore
transmit simultaneously with the source. This assumption
makes noise forwarding/jamming type protocols meaningful,
unlike the orthogonal communication scenario considered in
[16]. However, as the relay does not hear the source transmis-
sion, correlated jamming as in [17] or [18] is not possible. As
the jammer relay helps the eavesdropper, it tries to minimize
the secrecy rate, while the source transmits to maximize the
secrecy rate. We formulate this problem as a two-player zero-
sum continuous game. We find the Nash equilibrium of this
game, which in general is obtained by a mixed strategy.
In the next section we state the problem. In Section III we
describe the game theoretic formulation. In Section IV we
present the Nash equilibrium solution of the game, and in
Section V we conclude.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We investigate the four terminal network composed of a
source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay
denoted by S, D, E and R respectively. The network under
investigation is shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. The system model shows the source (S), the destination (D), the
eavesdropper (E) and the jammer relay (R). The jammer relay aims to assist
the eavesdropper.
The received signals at the destination and the eavesdropper
are
YD,i = hSDXS,i + hRDXR,i + ZD,i
YE,i = hSEXS,i + hREXR,i + ZE,i,
where XS,i and XR,i are the signals the source and the
relay transmit at time i, i = 0, ..., n. The complex additive
Gaussian noise at the destination and at the eavesdropper are
respectively denoted as ZD,i and ZE,i and are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and unit variance.
The channel gains between node k and node l are shown as
hkl, k = S,R, l = D,E. All channel gains are fixed and
assumed to be known at all nodes. The source and the jammer
relay have average power constraints
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X2S,i] ≤ PS ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X2R,i] ≤ PR.
For convenience we will write γkl = |hkl|2Pk, k = S,R,
l = D,E, to indicate the received power at node l due to
node k.
The source aims to send the message W securely to the
destination in n channel uses. The equivocation rate is defined
as [3] the entropy of the message W given the eavesdropper’s
observation Y nE,1, H(W |Y nE,1)/n. Note that the equivocation
rate is equal to H(W )/n, if the eavesdropper’s observation
is independent from the message W . On the other hand,
if the observation Y nE,1 is enough to recover the message
W with arbitrary small probability of error as n approaches
infinity, then the equivocation rate is zero. The perfect secrecy
rate, Rs is defined as the maximum information rate such
that the equivocation rate is equal to the transmission rate;
i.e. limn→∞H(W |Y nE,1)/n = limn→∞H(W )/n, and the
probability of error at the destination P (n)e approaches zero,
as n approaches infinity.
In this problem the source and the jammer relay have
opposing interests. The former wants to increase the secrecy
rate, and the latter wants the decrease Rs. Thus, this problem
constitutes a zero-sum game, where the utility is the perfect
secrecy rate. The source and the jammer relay make their
decisions simultaneously, and hence the game is strategic. The
source chooses a strategy ξ and the jammer relay chooses a
strategy η simultaneously. The secrecy rate, or the payoff, is
a function of both ξ and η. If a certain positive secrecy rate,
Rs(ξ, η) is achieved, then the source node’s payoff is equal to
Rs(ξ, η) and the relay’s payoff is equal to −Rs(ξ, η).
In the next section, we define the strategy spaces for ξ and
η and calculate the payoff function Rs(ξ, η).
III. GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
For the communication to take place the source node maps
its uniformly chosen message W to a channel codeword XnS,1.
The rate of this communication will be specified later.
If the jammer relay were a jammer only, then it would
simply transmit unstructured noise. However, in this problem
it is not merely a jammer, but aims help the eavesdropper
to ensure no secret communication takes place. Then, we
consider two options for the jammer relay: it can either
send unstructured noise or structured codewords. Unstructured
noise is useful as it harms the legitimate communication, yet
it also harms the eavesdropper. Structured codewords have the
potential to help the eavesdropper more.
As the jammer relay does not hear the source node, struc-
tured codewords can only carry dummy information. However,
structured codewords still force the source to transmit at lower
rates to ensure decodability at the destination and can affect
the secrecy rates. Thus, we assume that the jammer relay
generates dummy codewords and sends the channel codeword
XmR,1 or simply forwards noise. In [19], it is argued that
there is no loss of generality in assuming same codeword
lengths for both players in an information theoretic game on
interference channels. Even though in our problem the players
are adverseries, we assume m = n. We assume all nodes in the
system know both the source and the jammer relay’s strategies,
including the codebooks.
When both the source and the jammer relay send structured
codewords, the problem becomes similar to a multiple-access
channel with an external eavesdropper. In a multiple-access
channel, both the transmitters need to be decoded at the
destination. However, in this problem, the jammer relay only
sends dummy codewords, and does not need to be decoded
either at the destination or at the eavesdropper.
Observe that when the jammer relay sends Gaussian code-
words/noise with full power, the best distribution for the source
is the Gaussian distribution [4] with zero mean and variance
PS . On the other hand, when the source sends Gaussian
codewords with zero mean and variance PS , then the jammer
relay distribution that decreases the perfect secrecy the most
is the Gaussian distribution, zero mean and variance PR.
Motivated by these observations, we assume that the source
and the jammer relay choose their codebooks independent and
identically distributed Gaussian with zero mean and variances
PS and PR respectively. Then, the source strategy, denoted
by ξ, is to choose the rate of the information W , and the
jammer relay strategy, η, is to choose the rate of its dummy
information. We argue below that structured codewords at the
jammer relay also include the possibility of sending pure noise.
Under these assumptions, the destination can decode both
the source and the jammer relay codewords if the rate pair
(ξ, η) is in R[D]MAC
R
[D]
MAC =

(ξ, η)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ξ ≤ log(1 + γSD)
η ≤ log(1 + γRD)
ξ + η ≤ log(1 + γSD + γRD)

 . (1)
However, the jammer relay only sends dummy codewords, and
does not need to be decoded either at the destination or at
the eavesdropper. If the destination cannot decode the relay
codeword, it can simply treat it as noise. Thus, all ξ rates in
R
[D]
N
R
[D]
N =
{
ξ
∣∣∣ ξ ≤ log(1 + γSD1+γRD
) }
(2)
are achievable as well. Overall, we say that the destination can
decode W with arbitrarily small probability of error, if (ξ, η) ∈
R[D] = R
[D]
MAC
⋃
R
[D]
N . Note that after taking the union, the
individual constraint on η in (1) is not needed anymore. We
also define three other regions R[E]MAC, R
[E]
N , and R[E] as in
(1) and (2) and R[D], but replacing all D with E. Then for
a fixed source and jammer relay rate pair (ξ, η), the payoff
function, Rs(ξ, η), is equal to
Rs(ξ, η)
=


0, if
(
(ξ, η) ∈ R[E] or
(ξ, η) 6∈ R[D]
)
max
RS,d
(ξ −RS,d), if

 (ξ, η) ∈ R
[D] and
(RS,d, η) 6∈ R
[E] and
Rs(ξ, η) +RS,d = ξ

(3)
The proof of how this secrecy rate would be achieved is similar
to [14], [20] and is skipped here.
An example is shown in Fig. 2 for the boundary regions
R[D] and R[E] with the corner points defined as
(∆S ,∆R) =
(
log(1 + γSD), log
(
1 +
γRD
1 + γSD
))
,
(ΩS ,ΩR) =
(
log
(
1 +
γSD
1 + γRD
)
, log(1 + γRD)
)
,
(δS , δR) =
(
log(1 + γSE), log
(
1 +
γRE
1 + γSE
))
,
(ωS , ωR) =
(
log
(
1 +
γSE
1 + γRE
)
, log(1 + γRE)
)
.
For a fixed (ξ, η), the secrecy rate defined in (3) corresponds
to the horizontal distance between the point (ξ, η) and the
dashed line in Fig. 2, if (ξ, η) is in between the solid and
dashed lines. If (ξ, η) ∈ R[E], that is inside the dashed line,
then both the destination and the eavesdropper can reliably
decode W , and the secrecy rate is zero. If (ξ, η) 6∈ R[D],
outside the solid line, the destination cannot decode the
source message reliably. The secrecy rate is zero, because
there is no reliable communication between the source and
the destination. Because of this immediate drop in secrecy
rates beyond the boundary of R[D], the payoff function is
discontinuous.
Note that the corner point (ωs, ωR) is equivalent to send-
ing unstructured Gaussian noise at the jammer relay. Thus,
sending unstructured Gaussian noise is also covered in our
model, although we arrived at the Rs(ξ, η) function assuming
structured codewords for the jammer relay.
Depending on γkl, the positions of the corner points with
respect to each other change, and multiple cases arise. In this
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Fig. 2. Boundaries for R[D] and R[E], under conditions (i)-(v).
paper we investigate the case, where the conditions (i) log(1+
γSE + γRE) ≤ log(1 + γSD + γRD), (ii) δS ≤ ∆S , (iii)
∆R ≤ δR, (iv) ωS ≤ ΩS ≤ δS , and (v) δR ≤ ΩR ≤ ωR
are all satisfied. The case shown in Fig. 2 satisfies all these
conditions. Other cases require similar techniques, but have
different solutions. Due to limited space, we do not explain
those here.
IV. PLAYING THE GAME
In this section we explain pure and mixed strategy solutions
to the zero-sum game and show that this problem has a mixed
strategy solution. We also state the cumulative distribution
functions for the source and jammer relay strategies and find
the equilibrium secrecy rate, or the value of the game.
A zero-sum game has a pure strategy solution if [21]
max
ξ
min
η
Rs(ξ, η) = min
η
max
ξ
Rs(ξ, η).
However, if there is no (ξ, η) that satisfies this equation, then
no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, and a mixed strategy
solution is needed.
Lemma 1: When γkl, k = S,R, l = D,T satisfy the
conditions (i)-(v), the two-player zero-sum game does not have
a pure strategy solution.
Proof: In this game maxξ minη Rs(ξ, η) = 0, whereas
minηmaxξ Rs(ξ, η) = log(1 + γSD + γRD)− log(1 + γSE +
γRE). These two values are not the same, hence a pure strategy
solution does not exist.
Lemma 2: The game defined in Lemma 1, is equivalent to
the game played over the square, where the source and jammer
relay strategies are respectively restricted to the compact
intervals ξ ∈ [ΩS ,ΩS + L] and η ∈ [δR, δR + L], where L is
the edge length L = ΩR − δR.
Proof: To prove this we eliminate comparable and inferior
strategies for the source and the jammer relay. First note that
Rs(ξ, η) ≤ Rs(ΩS , η), for ξ < ΩS , and 0 < η.
In other words, as both players are rational, the source never
chooses rates ξ < ΩS . Similarly, the source node never
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Fig. 3. The equivalent game for the game in Fig. 2.
chooses its rate larger than ∆S , as the secrecy rate Rs(ξ, η) =
0 no matter what the relay action is. On the other hand,
Rs(ξ, η) ≥ Rs(ξ,ΩR), for ξ > 0, and η > ΩR.
Thus, for the jammer relay choosing any rate larger than ΩR
is equivalent to choosing rate equal to ΩR. The strategies η >
ΩR are comparable to the strategy η = ΩR, and we can omit
the strategies η > ΩR. Similarly,
Rs(ξ, η) ≥ Rs(ξ, δR), for ξ > 0, and η < δR.
Thus, the strategies η < δR are inferior to η = δR and the
jammer relay never chooses its rate less than δR. Finally, in
this reduced game, the source node does not choose its rate
larger than log(1 + γSD + γRD) − δR, as this choice makes
its payoff equal to zero. In other words,
Rs(ξ, η) ≤ Rs(log(1 + γSD + γRD)− δR, η),
for ξ > log(1 + γSD + γRD)− δR and δR < η < ΩR. These
strategy eliminations result in the desired reduced game.
The reduced game based on Lemma 2 is shown in Fig. 3. We
next describe how to solve for the value of this reduced game.
The parameter a is defined as a = (δS − ΩS)/L.
Theorem 1: Suppose a ∈ [k/(k + 1), (k + 1)/(k + 2)], for
some integer k ≥ 0. Then the reduced game in Lemma 2
has the Nash equilibrium secrecy rate R∗s = Lα(1 − a),
where α = gk(a), and is achieved with cumulative distribution
functions for the source and the jammer relay Fξ(ξ) and
Fη(η), respectively. The c.d.f.s Fξ(ξ), Fη(η) and the function
gk(a) can be analytically computed for a given k.
Proof: First we normalize the edge lengths of the square
in Fig. 3 and use the game-theoretic techniques in [21] to solve
the continuous game played over the unit square. As the space
is limited, the proof is omitted here and will be presented in
the journal submission.
Since there are infinitely many intervals for a in Theorem 1
(corresponding to each nonnegative integer k) we present some
examples here. When 0 ≤ a ≤ 1/2, α = g0(a) = e
−1/(1−a)
1− a1−a e
−1
and the c.d.f. for the source node is
Fξ(ξ) =


αe
ξ−ΩS
L(1−a) , if ΩS ≤ ξ ≤ ΩS + L(1− a)
α
[
(1 + e−1)e
ξ−ΩS
L(1−a) − 11−a (
ξ−ΩS
L )e
ξ−ΩS
L(1−a)−1
]
,
if ΩS + L(1− a) ≤ ξ ≤ ΩS + L
.
The c.d.f. for the jammer relay is the same as Fξ(ξ) if ξ and
ΩS are replaced with η and δR respectively. When 1/2 < a ≤
2/3,
α = g1(a) =
e−1/(1−a)
1 + e−1 + 2e−2 − e
−1+2e−2
1−a +
e−2
2(1−a)2
,
and the c.d.f. for the source node is given in (4). The c.d.f. for
the jammer relay is the same as (4) if ξ and ΩS are replaced
with η and δR respectively.
Although, it is always possible to obtain the optimal c.d.f.s.
and α analytically for a given a, a general closed form
expression does not exist. Therefore, it is important to find
a practical way to calculate the value of the game.
Theorem 2: Suppose we form a discrete approximation of
the reduced game in Lemma 2, by taking (T + 1)2 samples;
obtained by dividing the square into a uniform grid. Then
the discrete source strategies are ξl = ωS + Ll/T , the relay
strategies are ηl = δR + Ll/T , and the payoff function is
Rs(l) = Rs(ξl, ηl), where l = 0, 1, ..., T . The value of this
discrete game can be obtained using linear programming.
Furthermore, for a chosen T, difference between values of the
discrete and the continuous game is at most 2
√
(2)L/T .
Proof: We use the approximation techniques suggested
in [22]. Due to space limited space, the proof is omitted.
A. Achievability
If the solution of the game is a pure strategy, the achievabil-
ity follows using the arguments in Section III. As the solution
is mixed, it is also important to explain how information
theoretically the Nash equilibrium is attained.
In a mixed strategy the players randomize their actions over
a set of strategies with a certain probability distribution. The
players act repeatedly and ignore any strategic link that may
exist between plays. They also know each other’s probability
distribution functions, and hence formulate their own actions.
In the game defined in this paper, when a mixed strategy
solution is needed, the source node assumes a variable rate
Fξ(ξ) =


αe
ξ−ΩS
L(1−a) , ΩS ≤ ξ ≤ ΩS + L(1− a)
α
[
(1 + e−1)e
ξ−ΩS
L(1−a) − 11−a (
ξ−ΩS
L )e
ξ−ΩS
L(1−a)
−1
]
, ΩS + L(1− a) ≤ ξ ≤ ΩS + 2L(1− a)
αe
ξ−ΩS
L(1−a)
[
1 + e−1 + 2e−2 − 11−a (e
−1 + 2e−2)( ξ−ΩSL ) +
(
ξ−ΩS
L )
2e−2
2(1−a)2
]
, ΩS + 2L(1− a) ≤ ξ ≤ ΩS + L
(4)
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Fig. 4. Optimal c.d.f. for the source, for the continuous and discrete games
when a = 0.5255
scheme, similar to the one adopted for fading eavesdropper
channels [23].
In this variable rate scheme, the source generates a total
of 2nBE(ξ) codewords, where B is the number of blocks the
game is played, and E(ξ) is the expected rate for the source
node, expectation calculated over the joint c.d.f. Fξ(ξ)Fη(η).
The source uses these codewords to form a secure code that
conveys nBR∗s bits of information in B blocks [2], where
R∗s is the value of the game or the Nash secrecy rate. In each
block, the source randomly chooses a rate ξ according to Fξ(ξ)
and transmits nξ bits of the codeword chosen to represent the
secure information. Similarly, the jammer relay chooses a rate
η according to Fη(η). Since the eavesdropper cannot improve
its mutual information more than ξ, as in the variable rate case
of [23], (3) is still valid and R∗s is attained as both n and B
approach infinity.
B. Examples
Now, we compare the optimal strategies for the discrete
and continuous games using the solutions in Theorems 1 and
2, when 1/2 < a ≤ 1. We assume |hSD| = 1, |hSR| =
1/3, |hRD| = 1/2, and |hSE | = |hRE | = 2/3. The source
and the jammer relay power constraints are Ps = Pr = 10.
Then a = 0.5255, L = 0.946 and α = 0.20484. We find
the equilibrium secrecy rate of the continuous game as 0.092
bits/channel use. To use the discrete approximation we set T =
400. Choosing this sample size, we analytically prove that the
difference between the value of discrete and continuous games
is at most 0.007. Yet, the actual difference is much smaller
and we find that the value of the discrete game as 0.0923
bits/channel use. Note that these values are much smaller than
the no jammer relay case, for which the secrecy rate is equal
to 1.0146 bits/channel use. The optimal c.d.f. for the source
for the continuous and discrete games are very close to each
other and are shown in Fig. 4. We observe that Fξ(ξ) is zero
if ξ < 1.947 = ΩS , and is 1 if ξ > 2.893 = ΩS+L. Note that
in the reduced game, sending Gaussian noise with full power
is still one of jammer relay’s possible strategies.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated the four terminal network with
a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay.
The source and the jammer relay have conflicting interests.
The former aims higher secrecy rates, whereas the latter aims
lower secrecy rates. Due to this conflict, we formulate this
problem as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, and find
the optimal solution for the source and the jammer relay to be
mixed strategies. We find the equilibrium secrecy rate of the
game, in addition to optimal cumulative distribution functions
for the source and the jammer relay. We also find a discrete
approximation to the continuous game, whose value can be
made arbitrarily close to the value of the continuous game. Our
results show that the presence of the jammer relay decreases
the secrecy rates significantly. As for future work, the cases in
which the jammer relay hears the source transmission remain
open.
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